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-1-War is often thought of as lawless violence. On the contrary, conduct during wartime has often been regulated by agreements to restrict violence. Such agreements can be either explicit or tacit; they may be the product of prewar negotiations or just commonly accepted military practices. These agreements have actually succeeded in limiting the range of weapons employed, how weaponry is used, and the legitimate targets of force during wartime. Still, many of these agreements fail during wartime. The record of the laws of war is mixed at best (Morrow 2007 ).
How can we understand which conventions are observed and which violated and when such violations are likely to occur?
International politics in modern times generally recognizes no authority above the nationstate. Agreements among states are enforceable only by the agreeing states themselves. This assumption of anarchy poses a paradox for agreements to limit violence during wartime. War is ultimate form of enforcement available to states. What can states do to enforce their agreement if they are already at war?
Reciprocity serves as the main tool to enforce agreements in international politics.
Enforcement of an agreement is devolved to the parties themselves. Damaged parties have the option to respond with retaliatory sanctions to a violation of an agreement. The threat of reciprocal sanctions may be sufficient to deter violations, and so agreements can be enforced in international politics.
Agreements to limit violence during wartime can be enforced through a form of reciprocity as well. If a warring state violates an agreement, the damaged side can respond in kind. Sometimes, as in the case of chemical weapons during the Second World War, that threat is sufficient to sustain a convention against violence. In other cases, such as treatment of -2-prisoners of war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War, the threat is not sufficient to deter proscribed violence. Such reciprocal threats can succeed only when the reciprocal threat is clear and of sufficient magnitude to deter violations.
However, this reciprocity differs from the reciprocal sanctions familiar in trade negotiations and repeated game models. In the latter, the sanction imposes a punishment that is meant to exceed the gain from the original violation, and so deter the violation. In the former, retaliation abandons the same restraint as the violation. If a state uses gas, then its opponent is no longer held to its promise to not use gas. Rather than being a punishment, reciprocity in the laws of war means that the war will now be fought without the restraint that was violated.
In practice, reciprocity on the laws of war also exists on the battlefield between soldiers fighting one another. When the soldiers of one side kill those attempting to surrender or commit The laws of war create rights and obligations for soldiers on the battlefield in addition to the restraints they place on state policy during war. Reciprocity on the battlefield could control some behavior on the battlefield, particularly perfidy. But this form of reciprocity is weak in -3-other areas because the soldiers of one side lack the information to target violators on the other side individually (Fearon and Laitin 1996) games. Within each separate game, the institution defines which equilibrium the players will play in that game. Different players play in each game with each player active in only one or two of the related games. The players assume that all the other games will be played according to the equilibrium specified in the institution. Play in these other games is fixed then in the context of each game individually. Because the outcomes of one game depend in part on the outcomes of other games, optimal play in each of them depends on how the others will be played. The collection of interdependent equilibria across the games is institutional in that it is difficult for any set of players playing one game to change the equilibrium they are playing.
The case of the laws of war developed in this paper clarifies this concept of equilibrium.
The actors are the two governments at war and the soldiers in their armies. There are three The strategic logic of the cases is simple. The first and third cases have prisoners' dilemma payoffs for low types, those who are willing to commit violations. They always prefer Violate.
The risk of facing such a type leads some types to play Violate to avoid the worse payoff of being a victim (you play Honor, opponent plays Violate, payoff T) even though they prefer the outcome i where both play Honor (payoff 0) to their own unilateral violation (payoff T -t < 0). Case 3 is the extreme case where the risk that the other side will violate is so high that all types play
Violate to protect themselves. The second case has dynamics closer to Chicken in the sense that being a victim is preferable to both playing Violate. 
A : #(a played Honor)/#(a ) -#(a played Violate and detected) -pD
The equilibrium of the monitoring game is straightforward. It depends on the cost of monitoring as follows:
Simply, A engages in no monitoring when monitoring is more costly than average because the dual cost of setting up the monitoring and of catching some of its soldiers in violations exceeds -12-the benefit of deterring violations. When monitoring is less costly than average, this calculation reverses, and A engages in enough monitoring to deter all violations.
State-to-State Deterrence
The war between A and B engage is represented by a model in the spirit of Smith (1998).
The sides fight a series of battles over an ordered set of fixed points in discrete time. If this condition holds for some #a violate, I conjecture that it is likely to hold for more than one.
There would then be multiple equilibria of levels of violations driven by state policy. 
Interactions of the

